The endowment effect, coined by Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler, posits that people tend to inflate the value of items they own. We study endowment equilibria -Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with valuations that are subject to the endowment effect. While standard Walrasian equilibria are guaranteed to exist only for the restricted class of gross substitutes valuations, a recent work of Babaioff et al. [EC'18] showed that for a particular formulation of the endowment effect, every market with submodular valuations admits an endowment equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium gives at least half of the optimal social welfare. Unfortunately, their existence guarantee provably fails to extend to the broader class of XOS valuations.
Introduction
Consider the following combinatorial market problem: A seller wishes to sell a set M of m items to n consumers. Each consumer i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + that assigns a nonnegative value v i (X) to every subset of items X ⊆ M . The valuation functions can exhibit various combinations of substitutability and complementarity over items; and as standard, valuations
That is, for every set Y , the difference between v X and v is some function of the sets X, and X ∩ Y . Thus, the endowment valuation of Y with respect to X is given by:
for some function g X : 2 X → R. The function g X is referred to as the gain function with respect to X. Based on this formulation, Condition (2) becomes a condition solely on the functions g X ; namely, it requires that g X (Z) ≤ g X (X) for all Z ⊆ X (see Section 3.1). An endowment effect formulation, or in short: an endowment effect, is then given by a collection of functions g X for each X ⊆ M that satisfy this condition. Moreover, an endowment environment is given by a vector of endowment effects for the consumers E = (E 1 , . . . , E n ). When clear in the context, we sometimes use the terms endowment effect and endowment environment interchangeably, for example when the endowment effect of all consumers is the same.
In Section 3.3 we define a partial order ≺ over endowment effects, which naturally extends to a partial order over endowment environments. We show that an endowment effect that "dominates" another endowment effect based on ≺ preserves its stability. More formally, given two endowment environments, E, E ′ , such that E ≺ E ′ , a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the endowed valuations according to E is also a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to the endowed valuations according to E ′ (Corollary 3.8). 
Existence of Equilibria and Welfare Approximation
In this section we present our existence and approximation results. All of our approximation results hold with respect to the optimal welfare according to the original valuations, and even with respect to the optimal fractional allocation. 3 Recall that Babaioff et al. prove that every market with submodular consumers admits an E I -endowment equilibrium that gives a 2-approximation welfare guarantee. In Corollary 4.13 we show that the same proof technique can be used to prove that the exact same result holds also with respect to the weaker endowment effect E SOM . (We show in Proposition 3.9 that for submodular consumers, E SOM ≺ E I .)
For the larger class of XOS consumers, Babaioff et al. show that an endowment equilibrium may not exist even with respect to an endowment effect α · E I = {α · g : g ∈ E I } for an arbitrarily large α. This negative result may lead one to conclude that while the endowment effect improves stability for submodular valuations, XOS markets may remain unstable even with respect to endowed valuations. However, we show that this negative result is an artifact of the specific formulation chosen by the authors. As established in the following theorem, the stronger endowment effect E AL leads to a sweeping existence and approximation result for markets with XOS valuations.
Theorem [Thm. 4.1] Every market with XOS consumers admits an E AL -endowment equilibrium that gives a 2-approximation welfare guarantee.
Moreover, we show a natural better response dynamics for endowed valuations that converges to an E AL -endowment equilibrium. The dynamics is a variant of the dynamics considered by Fu et al. [2012] ; Christodoulou et al. [2016] .
The theorem above shows that a stronger endowment effect enables extending the equilibrium existence (and approximation) result from submodular valuataions to XOS valuations. Can this result be extended further? In Section 4.4, we explore more general valuations. First, we provide an endowment effect E P ROP that inflates the value of a set linearly in its size, and show that there always exists an E P ROP -endowment equilibrium. In contrast, we show that for any endowment effect with a "reasonable" inflation (specifically, up to O( √ m)), an endowment equilibrium may not exist for subadditive valuations.
The Power of Bundling
We next study the power of bundling in settings with endowed valuations. A bundling B = {B 1 , . . . B k } is a partition of the set of items M into k disjoint bundles. A competitive bundling equilibrium (CBE) [Dobzinski et al., 2015] is a bundling B and a Walrasian equilibrium in the market induced by B (i.e., the market where B 1 , . . . , B k are the indivisible items). It is easy to see that a CBE always exists (say, bundle all items together, and assign the grand bundle to the highest value consumer for a price of the second highest value). However, in contrast to WE, CBEs do not have any meaningful welfare guarantees in general. Recent literature studied competitive bundling equilibra (and variants thereof) with good welfare guarantees [Feldman and Lucier, 2014; Feldman et al., 2016; Dobzinski et al., 2015] .
In this paper we introduce the notion of E-endowment CBE. An E-endowment CBE is a CBE with respect to the endowed valuations. We provide welfare guarantees for E-endowment CBEs, for any endowment effect E satisfying a mild assumption that g X (X) ≥ v(X) for all X ⊆ M . Endowment effects satisfying this assumption are said to be good. For example, the endowment effect considered in Babaioff et al. is clearly good.
Interestingly, bundling leads to a sweeping positive result when combined with good endowment effects:
Theorem [Thm. 5.4] Every market (with arbitrary valuations) admits an E-endowment CBE with optimal social welfare, for every good endowment environment E.
For example, a direct corollary of the last theorem is that every market, no matter how complex valuations are, admits an endowment CBE with optimal social welfare, when considering the endowment effect formulation considered by Babaioff et al.. We note that this result cannot be extended to all endowment effects within our framework. In particular, for endowment effects such that for some β < 1 it holds that g X (X) ≤ β · v(X) for all X ⊆ M , there are instances that admit no endowment CBE with optimal welfare, already for XOS valuations (Proposition 5.5). For this subclass of endowment effects, we provide approximation lower bounds as a function of the parameter β, for different classes of valuations (including XOS, subadditive, and arbitrary; see Section 5).
Equilibrium computation. Babaioff et al. showed computational barriers towards computing E I -endowment equilibria, and raised the following question (recall that α · E I denotes the endowment effect that multiplies each gain function g ∈ E I by α):
Are there allocations that can be both efficiently computed and paired with item prices that form an α · E I -endowment equilibrium for a small value of α?
As shown in Babaioff et al., every α · E I -endowment equilibrium gives α approximation to the optimal social welfare. In contrast, when turning to endowment CBEs, no meaningful approximation can be guaranteed in general (see Section 3.2). Therefore, in settings with bundling, the question should be reformulated as follows:
Are there approximately optimal allocations that can be both efficiently computed and paired with bundle prices, that form an E-endowment CBE for some natural endowment effect E?
We provide the following positive results.
Theorem [Thm. 5.7] For submodular valuations, and a good endowment environment E, there exists a polynomial algorithm that given an allocation S ′ , produces an allocation S and bundle prices p, so that (S, p) is an E-endowment CBE with at least as much social welfare as S ′ . The algorithm invokes a polynomial number of value queries.
Theorem [Thm. 5.8] For general valuations, and a good endowment environment E, there exists a polynomial algorithm that given an allocation S ′ , produces an allocation S and bundle prices p, so that (S, p) is an E-endowment CBE with at least as much social welfare as S ′ . The algorithm invokes a polynomial number of demand queries This effectively reduces the problem of finding good endowment CBEs to the problem of algorithmic welfare maximization.
Comparison to Related Work
Our work builds upon the recent work by Babaioff et al. [2018] that proposed the first formulation for the endowment effect in combinatorial auctions. They show that every market with submodular valuations admits an E I -endowment equilibrium that gives at least half of the optimal social welfare.
Other relaxations of WE have been considered in the literature in an attempt to ameliorate the non-existence problem of WE, and achieve approximate stability and efficiency for more general valuation classes than gross substitutes. Fu et al. [2012] considered a relaxed notion of WE, termed conditional equilibrium. A conditional equilibrium is a pair of an allocation and item prices satisfying individual rationality, and such that no consumer wishes to expand their allocation, but disposing of items is not allowed. They showed that every conditional equilibrium has at least half of the optimal welfare. Moreover, every market with XOS valuations admits a conditional equilibrium, which can be reached via a "flexible ascent auction", an algorithm proposed by Christodoulou et al. [2016] . 4 A different relaxation of WE was considered by , where the utility maximization condition is preserved, but market clearance is relaxed (i.e., items with positive prices may be unsold). Using this notion, an equilibrium always exists (say, price all items at some prohibitively large price), but such equilibria carry no approximation guarantees. For this notion it is shown that even for simple markets with two submodular consumers, the social welfare approximation guarantee cannot be better than Ω( √ m).
Our results on endowment CBE (Section 5) should be compared with previous notions of bundling equilibria [Feldman and Lucier, 2014; Feldman et al., 2016; Dobzinski et al., 2015] . In these settings, the market designer first partitions the set of items into indivisible bundles B = {B 1 , . . . , B k } (these are the indivisible items in the induced market), and assigns prices to these bundles instead of the original items, and a CBE is a Walrasian equilibrium in the induced market. Dobzinski et al. [2015] showed that every market (with arbitrary valuations) admits a CBE that gives approximation guarantee ofÕ( min{m, n}). Moreover, given an optimal allocation, a CBE with such approximation can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, they provide a polynomial time algorithm that computes a CBE with aÕ(m 2/3 ) approximation guarantee.
This should be compared to Theorems 5.4 and 5.8 in this paper. Theorem 5.4 shows that for a wide variety of endowment effects (including the one considered by Babaioff et al.) , there always exists an endowment CBE that gives the optimal welfare. Theorem 5.8 shows that for a wide variety of endowment effects (including that of Babaioff et al.) , given an arbitrary allocation S, one can compute, in polynomial time, an endowment CBE with (weakly) higher welfare than S. Thus, the problem of computing nearly-efficient endowment CBEs is effectively reduced to the pure algorithmic problem of welfare approximation -a problem with vast literature (e.g., [Dobzinski et al., 2005; Lehmann et al., 2006; Dobzinski and Schapira, 2006; Feige and Vondrak, 2006; Feige, 2009; Feige and Izsak, 2013; Chakrabarty and Goel, 2010] ).
A different notion of bundling equilibria was considered by Feldman et al. [2016] . This notion is a relaxed version of CBE, where some bundles (with positive prices) may remain unsold. Under this notion, for arbitrary valuations, given an arbitrary allocation S, one can compute, in polynomial time, an equilibrium with welfare at least half of the welfare of S.
All the notions above consider a concise set of bundles, and linear pricing over bundles. More general forms of bundle pricing, including non-linear and non-anonymous pricing, lead to welfaremaximizing results, but are highly impractical (in particular, they use an exponential number of prices) [Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002; Parkes and Ungar, 2000; Ausubel and Milgrom, 2000; Lahaie and Parkes, 2009; Sun and Yang, 2014 ].
Paper Organization
Section 2 presents some preliminaries on Walrasian equilibria, valuation classes and query models. The endowment effect framework is described in Section 3.1, followed by Section 3.2 that establishes efficiency guarantees for endowment equilibria, and Section 3.3 which describes the partial order over endowment effects. In Section 4 we provide existence results for endowment equilibria, and in Section 5 we introduce the notion of endowment-Competitive Bundling Equilibrium (CBE), and provide existence, approximation and computational guarantees with respect to this notion. All missing proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Preliminaries
Consider a market with a set M of m items and n consumers. Each consumer i has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R + that assigns a real value v i (X) for every subset of items X ⊆ M . As standard, assume that valuations are normalized; i.e., v i (∅) = 0, and monotone (free-disposal), i.e., for any Z ⊆ X, v i (Z) ≤ v i (X). An allocation is a partition of M to disjoint bundles S = (S 1 , . . . S n ) where bundle S i is allocated to consumer i.
In this work we measure the quality of an allocation S by its social welfare SW (S) = i∈[n] v i (S i ). An item pricing is a vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) where p j is the price of item j. Given an allocation S and item pricing p, consumer i's quasi-linear utility is
Given a price vector p and a set X, we use p(X) = j∈X p j .
Definition 2.1. (Walrasian Equilibrium) A pair of an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . p m ) is a Walrasian Equilibrium (WE) if:
1. Utility maximization: Every consumer receives an allocation that maximizes her utility given the item prices, i.e., v i (S i ) − j∈S i p j ≥ v i (X) − j∈X p j for every consumer i and bundle X ⊆ M .
2. Market clearance: All items are allocated, i.e., i∈[n] S i = M .
Valuation types. We define the classes of valuation functions considered in this paper, from least to most general, except for unit demand valuations and budget additive valuations which have no containment relation.
• Unit demand: if there exist m values v 1 , . . . , v m , so that v(X) = max j∈X {v j }.
• Budget additive: if there exist m+1 values v 1 , . . . , v m , B, so that v(X) = min{B, j∈X {v j }}.
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• Submodular: if for any X,
Value and demand queries. The representation of combinatorial valuation functions is exponential in the parameters of the problem. A standard computational model in this setting is an oracle access. We consider value and demand queries.
• A value query for valuation v receives a set X as input, and returns v(X).
• A demand query for valuation v receives a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) as input, and returns a set X that maximizes u i (X, p).
3 Endowment effect
Endowment Effect Framework
In the introduction, we present two principles that underlie the endowment effect, namely the loss aversion principle and the residual equivalence principle. The loss aversion principle states that:
The endowed valuation v X : 2 M → R + satisfies the residual equivalence principle if and only
for some function g X : 2 X → R (See Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1). Moreover, the loss aversion principle implies that g X satisfies g X (Z) ≤ g X (X) for every Z ⊆ X (See Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.1). For simplicity of presentation, we also assume that the gain functions are normalized; i.e., for all X ⊆ M and g X , it holds that g X (∅) = 0. This implies that the endowed valuations are also normalized; i.e., v X (∅) = v(∅) + g X (∅) = 0. Our results can be generalized to non-normalized gain functions.
Based on this characterization, the following definition follows.
Given an endowment effect E, a valuation function v : 2 M → R + , and an endowed set X, the endowment valuation with respect to X is given by
For simplicity, when the endowment effect is clear in the context, we write v X instead of v X,E . An endowment environment is given by a vector of endowment effects for the consumers E = (E 1 , . . . , E n ).
We are now ready to define the notion of endowment equilibrium.
Definition 3.2. For an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and endowment environment E = (E 1 , . . . , E n ), a pair (S, p) of an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . S n ) and a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) forms an Eendowment equilibrium, if (S, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium with respect to (v S 1 ,E 1 1 , . . . , v Sn,En n ); i.e., 1. Utility maximization: Every consumer receives an allocation that maximizes her endowed utility given the item prices, i.e., for every consumer i and bundle X ⊆ M ,
We abuse notation and use E both for endowment effect and endowment environment when all consumers are subject to the same endowment effect.
Efficiency Guarantees for Endowment Equilibria
Given an endowment environment E, we are interested both in the existence and the social welfare of E-endowment equilibria. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria are related to the following linear program relaxation for combinatorial auctions (known as the configuration LP, see e.g., [Bikhchandani and Mamer, 1997] ):
The existence of a Walrasian equilibrium turns out to be closely related to the integrality gap of the configuration LP:
Theorem 3.3. [Nisan and Segal, 2006 ] An instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) admits a Walrasian Equilibrium if and only if the integrality gap of the configuration LP is 1. Moreover, an integral allocation S has payments p such that (S, p) is a Walrasian Equilibrium if and only if S is an optimal solution to the LP.
The following proposition gives an approximation guarantee for every endowment equilibrium, as a function of the gain functions. This is a natural generalization of [Babaioff et al., 2018, Corollary 3.7] . Note that an additional requirement is that the gain functions are non-negative.
Proposition 3.4. Given an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), let OP T be the value of the optimal fractional welfare. For an endowment effect E, where g X ≥ 0 for all g X ∈ E, if (S, p) is an E-endowment equilibrium, then the allocation S has welfare guarantee of at least
Proof. Since (S, p) is an E-endowment equilibrium, by Theorem 3.3, for any optimal fractional
where the first inequality is by optimality and the second is by non-negativity of the gain functions. The proof follows by multiplying both sides by i∈[n] v i (S i ) and rearranging.
An immediate corollary is the following:
, then the social welfare of S is a 2-approximation to the optimal fractional welfare.
Corollary 3.5 implies a 2-approximation guarantee for submodular consumers with E SOM endowment effect, or more generally, with any of the endowment effects listed in the following section.
Partial order over endowment effects
Recall that an endowment effect E is specified by a set of gain functions g X for every set X ⊆ M .
We next define a partial order over the space of endowment effects.
Definition 3.6. Fix a valuation function v, and two endowment effects E,Ê with respect to v.
• Given a set X,
• We write E ≺Ê (and say that E is dominated byÊ, orÊ dominates E) if for all X ⊆ M it holds that E ≺ XÊ .
We next show that an endowment effect always preserves the endowment equilibria of endowment effects dominated by it (Corrolary 3.8). To prove this, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. For an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and an endowment environment E = (E 1 , . . . , E n ), let (S, p) be an E-endowment equilibrium. For any consumer i, and endowment effectÊ
Rearranging, we get that
Rearranging, we conclude that:
It follows that S i maximizes consumer i's utility, as desired. Individual rationality follows by the fact that endowed valuations are normalized.
By applying Lemma 3.7 iteratively for each consumer i, we get the following:
and letÊ be such that for every i, E i ≺ S iÊ i . It holds that (S, p) is also anÊ-endowment equilibrium.
Recall the specific endowment effects considered in Section 1 (in what follows, it is assumed that Z ⊆ X, by the definition of g X ).
1. The sum of marginals endowment effect
where the last inequality follows by subadditivity. Finally, order the items in Z in some order 1, . . . , |Z|, then g X
where the last inequality follows by that {1, . . . , j − 1} ⊆ X \ {j} and submodularity of v.
By Corollary 3.8, it follows that every E SOM -endowment equilibrium is also an E I -endowment equilibrium.
Existence of endowment equilibrium
In this section we establish existence and efficiency guarantees of endowment equilibria in combinatorial auctions.
The main theorem in this section is that for every instance with XOS valuations, there exists an E AL -endowment equilibrium. Moreover, there exists an algorithm that given an initial allocation, finds an E AL -endowment equilibrium with at least as much welfare.
Theorem 4.1. For any instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of XOS valuations, and any initial allocation
In Section 4.1 we show the connections between endowment equilibrium and conditional equilibrium. In Section 4.2 we provide the proof of Theorem 4.1. In Section 4.3 we show that for every instance with submodular valuations, there exists an E SOM -endowment equilibrium (recall that E SOM ≺ E I . We conclude in Section 4.4, showing that our existence results cannot be extended to subadditive valuations. In particular, for every endowment effect in our framework, there exists an instance with subadditive valuations that does not admit an endowment equilibrium.
Endowment Equilibrium and Conditional Equilibrium
Our analysis draws upon the relation between an endowment equilibrium and a conditional equilibrium [Fu et al., 2012] . The definition of a conditional equilibrium follows.
Definition 4.2. [Fu et al., 2012] For an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), a pair of allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and item pricing (p 1 , . . . p m ) is a conditional equilibrium if for all i = 1, . . . , n, 1. Individual rationality:
We first introduce the notion of inward stability. A set X is inward stable if the consumer never wishes to dispose of any subset of items from X (possibly by replacing them with a different set of items). Formally: 
This means that if X is inward stable for consumer i, then there exists a utility-maximizing set of items for consumer i that contains X.
In general, endowment and conditional equilibria are incomparable notions. The following proposition shows that any endowment equilibrium that is also individually rational with respect to the original valuations is a conditional equilibrium.
Proposition 4.4. For any instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), if a pair of allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and item prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) is an E-endowment equilibrium, and for all consumers i it holds that p(S i ) ≤ v i (S i ), then (S, p) is a conditional equilibrium.
Proof. Individual rationality p(S i ) ≤ v i (S i ) is given. It remains to show outward stability. For any consumer i with endowment effect E i , since (S, p) is an endowment equilibrium, it holds that for every
In the other direction, for a conditional equilibrium to be an endowment equilibrium, it needs to be inward stable with respect to the endowed valuations. In the following lemma we give a sufficient condition for inward stability.
Lemma 4.5. Given a consumer with valuation v, an endowment effect {g X } X , and item pricing
The following proposition shows that an allocation and prices that are both inward stable with respect to the endowed valuations, and outward stable, form an endowment equilibrium.
Proposition 4.6. For any instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), if the pair of allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and item prices (p 1 , . . . , p m ) is a conditional equilibrium, and the endowment environment E = (E 1 , . . . , E n ) is such that for every consumer i, the gain function
Proof. Fix a consumer i and a set X ⊆ M . It is given in the proposition that the conditions of Lemma 4.5 on
therefore, consumer i is utility maximizing. Finally, note that individual rationality follows by considering the case X = ∅.
Note that Proposition 4.6 implies that every conditional equilibrium is also an E AON -endowment equilibrium (see Proposition A.3 in Appendix A.2).
Proof of Main Result (Theorem 4.1)
In this section We show that the E AL -endowment effect leads to strong existence and efficiency guarantees in combinatorial markets with XOS valuations. In particular, we show that: (1) every market with XOS valuations admits an E AL -endowment equilibrium, (2) an optimal allocation S can always be paired with prices p such that (S, p) forms an E AL -endowment equilibrium, and (3) an E AL -endowment equilibrium can be reached using a natural dynamics that is a modified version of the "flexible ascent auction" presented by Fu et al. [2012] (given here as Algorithm 1). Recall also that by Corollary 3.5, every allocation that is part of an E AL -endowment equilibrium gives at least half of the welfare of the optimal (even fractional) allocation.
We begin by recalling the definition of supporting prices [Dobzinski et al., 2005] . Given a valuation v and a set X ⊆ M , the prices {p j } j∈X are supporting prices for v(X) if v(X) = j∈X p j and for every Z ⊆ X, v(Z) ≥ j∈Z p j . It was shown (e.g., in [Dobzinski et al., 2005] ) that a valuation is XOS if and only if for all X ⊆ M there exist supporting prices for v(X).
The following lemma shows that for XOS valuations, the condition of Lemma 4.5 holds with respect to the endowment effect E AL , and a set of supporting prices.
Lemma 4.7. Fix a consumer with an XOS valuation v. If (p 1 , . . . , p m ) are supporting prices w.r.t. v and X ⊆ M , then g X ∈ E AL satisfies g X (Z) − p(Z) ≤ g X (X) − p(X) for all Z ⊆ X.
Proof. Observe that by definition of supporting prices, it holds that p(X \ Z) ≤ v(X \ Z) for any Z ⊆ X. By definition of g X ∈ E AL , we have that g X (Z) = v(X) − v(X \ Z). Rearranging, we conclude that
as required.
The above lemma has an immediate implication. Recall that in [Fu et al., 2012] it was shown that in an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of XOS valuations, for any welfare-maximizing allocation S, if one sets the prices of items p in each S i to be the supporting prices with respect to v i and S i , then (S, p) is a conditional equilibrium. Combining the last observation with Lemma 4.7 and Proposition 4.6, we conclude the following:
Corollary 4.8. Fix an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of XOS valuations. For any welfare-maximizing allocation S there exist prices p such that (S, p) is an E AL -endowment equilibrium.
We now show that given a starting allocation S ′ , one can run a modified version of the "flexible ascent auction" from [Fu et al., 2012] , that results in an E AL -endowment equilibrium (S, p) with at least as much welfare as S ′ . Moreover, (S, p) also satisfies individual rationality with respect to the original valuations, which, by Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 4.4 implies that (S, p) is a conditional equilibrium and that SW (S) approximates the optimal fractional welfare OPT up to max{ 1 2 , SW (S ′ ) OP T }.
ALGORITHM 1: An E AL -endowment flexible ascent auction for XOS valuations. Input: XOS valuations (v 1 , . . . , v n ), allocation (S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ n ).; Output: Allocation S 1 , . . . , S n , prices p 1 , . . . , p m Set S ← S ′ Set p 1 , . . . , p m such that for all i ∈ [n] the prices {p j |j ∈ S i } are supporting prices for
The main difference of Algorithm 1 compared to the flexible ascent auction is that in the end of every iteration all the prices may change, not only the ones demanded in the current iteration. Specifically, given that at some iteration consumer i, who was previously allocated S i , is now allocated S i ∪ X for some X, then for all j such that S j \ X S j , the prices of S j \ X may change, so that the prices are supporting prices with respect to every consumer, and thus inward stability is maintained. This property implies that restricting attention to deviations that take the form of extending the current allocation is without loss.
The following lemma shows that the dynamics in Algorithm 1 are better-response dynamics.
Lemma 4.9. Let S and p be the allocation and price vector in the beginning of some iteration in Algorithm 1. For the chosen consumer i, and her corresponding set X, it holds that
I.e., consumer i performs a beneficial deviation.
Proof. It suffices to show that
is given by the algorithm. This follows directly by Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.7.
Note that in the end of every iteration, all prices are adjusted to be supporting prices for every consumer. This implies, by Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7, that the allocation of every consumer is inward stable.
Proposition 4.10. At each iteration of Algorithm 1, the social welfare strictly increases Proof. At the beginning of every iteration, for every consumer i, the prices p are supporting prices with respect to S i and v i . Therefore, p(S j ) = v j (S j ) for all j ∈ [n], which implies that p(M ) = j v j (S j ). Let i be the chosen consumer at the current iteration, and X be her corresponding set according to the algorithm. Let S new be the allocation obtained at the end of the iteration. Then
13 Lemma 4.9 together with Equality (3) gives
Proposition 4.11. When Algorithm 1 terminates at allocation S and price vector p, (S, p) is a conditional equilibrium.
Proof. When the algorithm terminates, by definition of the condition in the while loop, it holds that for all i and
Rearranging, we get that v S i i (X|S i ) ≤ p(X \ S i ). Combining with Equality (3) (residual equivalence) implies outward stability. Individual rationality for each consumer follows by the fact that the prices are supporting prices for each consumer.
Corollary 4.12. When Algorithm 1 terminates, it is an E AL -endowment equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 4.11 the algorithm terminates at a conditional equilibrium. Together with Proposition 4.7, we have by Proposition 4.6 that the algorithm terminates at an E AL -endowment equilibrium.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Existence and Approximation Guarantees for Endowment Effect E SOM .
In this section we show that for submodular valuations, an E SOM -endowment equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 4.13. Let (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be an instance of submodular valuations. There exists an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and item prices p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) so that (S, p) is an E SOM -endowment equilibrium.
The proof shows that the techniques used in Babaioff et al. [2018] for the endowment effect E I can be used to prove the existence of E SOM -endowment equilibrium. En route, the proof shows that the provided endowment equilibria are also conditional equilibria.
We begin with the definition of local optimum.
Definition 4.14. [Babaioff et al., 2018] For an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is a local optimum if ∪ i∈[n] S i = M and for every pair of consumers i, i ′ ∈ [n] and item j ∈ S i it holds that
The following proposition (essentially [Babaioff et al., 2018, Claim 4.4] combined with individual rationality) shows that for submodular valuations, their suggested endowment equilibria are also conditional equilibria.
Proposition 4.15. For an instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of submodular valuations, a local optimum (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and the item prices p j = v i(j) (j|S i(j) \ {j}), where i(j) is the consumer for which j ∈ S i(j) , is a conditional equilibrium.
Proof. Individual rationality: fix consumer i, and order the items in S i in some order 1, 2, . . . , |S i |,
, where the inequality follows by submodularity.
Outward stability: fix a consumer i and consider some X ⊆ M \ S i . Since S is a local optimum, for every j ∈ X it holds that v i (j|S i ) ≤ p j = v i(j) (j|S i(j) \ {j}). Order the items in X in some order 1, 2, . . . , |X|, then
where the first inequality follows by submodularity.
The proof of Theorem 4.13 now follows by the definition of the endowment effect E SOM .
Proof of Theorem 4.13. Consider a local optimum S and the prices p j = v i(j) (j|S i(j) \ {j}) where i(j) is the consumer for which j ∈ S i(j) . By Lemma 4.15, it holds that (S, p) is a conditional equilibrium. Moreover, for every consumer i, it holds that g S i ∈ E SOM satisfies the condition in Lemma 4.6, i.e., for all Z ⊆ S i , it holds that
Thus, Lemma 4.6 completes the proof.
Note that Theorem 4.13 combined with Proposition 3.9 directly implies the existence of E Iendowment equilibrium given in Babaioff et al.. 
Beyond XOS Valuations
First we show that there exists an endowment effect that inflates the value of a set linearly in the number of items, for which an endowment equilibrium always exists. Note that, in contrast to [Babaioff et al., 2018, Proposition 3.4] , in Proposition 4.16 the endowment effect of each consumer does not depend on the valuations of other consumers, nor on the valuation structure. Proof. Let consumer i be the consumer that maximizes the value of the grand bundle M . Consider the allocation of giving the grand bundle M to the consumer i, together with price v i (M ) for each item.
Let us see that this pair of allocation and prices is an E P ROP -endowment equilibrium. The utility of consumer i is g
therefore, consumer i does not wish to deviate. For any other consumer j, the utility from
We now show that for subadditive valuations, and endowment effects that inflate valuations by a "reasonable" amount, an endowment equilibrium may not exist.
Proposition 4.17. For any number of items m ≥ 3, there exists an instance with identical items, one subadditive consumer and one unit demand consumer, such that for any β ≤ O( √ m), and any endowment environment E that satisfies g X i (X) ≤ β · v i (X), for every consumer i and g X i ∈ E i , no E-endowment equilibrium exists.
Proof. Consider the following instance. Consumer 1 is subadditive with valuation v 1 ([m]) = 2, v 1 (∅) = 0, and v 1 (X) = 1 otherwise. Consumer 2 is unit demand with valuation v 2 (X) = m . But then consumer 2 is not utility maximizing, because:
where the last inequality follows by the restriction on β.
Alternatively, consider an allocation where consumer 2 is allocated a non-empty set X, then her value in the endowed valuation is
where the last inequality follows by the restriction on β. On the other hand, the marginal contribution of set X to consumer 1 is at least 1. Therefore, this cannot be an endowment equilibrium, since it is sub-optimal with respect to the endowed valuations.
In summary, Proposition 4.16 shows that the endowment effect E P ROP , which inflates the valuation by a factor of O(m) guarantees existence of endowment equilibrium. Proposition 4.17 shows that inflating the valuation by a factor of O( √ m) does not suffice for guaranteeing existence in general. Closing this gap is an interesting open problem.
Bundling
In this section we study the role of bundling in market efficiency and stability. We assume that the market designer partitions the set of items into indivisible bundles, and these bundles are the items in the induced market. We show that under a wide variety of endowment effects, the bundling operation can recover stability and maintain efficiency. A bundling B = {B 1 , . . . , B k } is a partition of the set of items M into k disjoint bundles (∪ j∈[k] B k = M ). When clear in the context, given a set of indices T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, we slightly abuse notation and write T to mean ∪ j∈T B j . Dobzinski et al. [2015] , define the notion of competitive bundling equilibrium as follows:
Definition 5.1. [Dobzinski et al., 2015] A Competitive Bundling Equilibrium (CBE) is a bundling B = {B 1 , . . . , B k } of M , a pair (S, p) of an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of the bundles to consumers together with bundle prices p = (p 1 , . . . , p k ) such that:
1. Utility maximization: Every consumer receives an allocation that maximizes her utility given the bundle prices, i.e., for every consumer i and subset of bundles indexed by
Market clearance: All items are allocated, i.e., i∈[n] ∪ j∈S i B j = M .
The natural combination of CBE and E-endowment equilibrium is simply a CBE with respect to the valuations subject to the endowment environment E. Here again, given a bundling B, and a set of bundles T , we abuse notation and write v T,E to denote v (∪j∈T B j ),E . a pair (S, p) of an allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of the bundles to consumers together with bundle prices (p 1 , . . . , p k ) such that:
1. Utility maximization: Every consumer receives an allocation that maximizes her endowed utility given the bundle prices, i.e., for every consumer i and subset of bundles indexed by
2. Market Clearance: All items are allocated, i.e., i∈[n] ∪ j∈S i B j = M .
When clear in the context we abuse notation and specify an E-endowment CBE by a pair (S, p) of an allocation S and pricing p. When doing so, we implicitly assume that the bundling is B = {S 1 , . . . , S n }.
Demand queries in reduced markets. Consider the market induced by bundling {B 1 , . . . , B k }. Given a valuation v and a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p k ), a demand query returns a set of bundles in arg max T ⊆[k] v i (T ) − j∈T p j .
Existence of Optimal Endowment CBEs
In this section, we provide a strong positive result for good endowment environments, defined as follows.
Definition 5.3. An endowment environment E is good if for all i ∈ [n] and X ⊆ M , it holds that g X i (X) ≥ v i (X), where g X i ∈ E i . For example, the endowment effect considered in Babaioff et al. (E I ) is good, as well as the absolute loss (E AL ) and the all-or-nothing (E AON ) endowment effects.
Our main result in this section is the following:
Theorem 5.4. For any instance v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), and any good endowment environment E, there exists an E-endowment CBE with optimal welfare.
Proof. Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) be some welfare-maximizing allocation for v. We claim that the bundling {S 1 , . . . , S n }, and the pair (S, p), where p i = v i (S i ) for every i is an E-endowment CBE. In the allocation S, the endowed utility of every consumer i is
Moreover, for any A ⊆ [n] \ {i} the utility maximization requirement is:
Substituting p j = v j (S j ) and rearranging, we need to show that
Since the endowment environment is good, it holds that g S i i (S i ) ≥ v i (S i ) for every i. Therefore, the left-hand side of the inequality is at least j∈A∪{i} v j (S j ) which, by optimality of S, is an optimal allocation in the reduced setting including only players in A∪{i} and items in ∪ j∈A∪{i} S j . The right-hand side is a specific allocation in the same reduced setting that gives all but S i to i, hence no better than an optimal allocation in the reduced setting.
Similarly, for any A such that i ∈ A ⊆ [n], the utility maximization requirement is:
which, by rearranging, gives
By optimality of S, the left-hand side is the welfare of an optimal allocation in the reduced setting including only players in A and items in ∪ j∈A S j . The right-hand side is a specific allocation in the same reduced setting that gives all items to i, hence no better than an optimal allocation in this reduced setting.
On the other hand, there are endowment environments (that are not good) for which Theorem 5.4 does not apply. We show that for any β < 1, and endowment environment E such that g X i (X) ≤ β · v i (X) for all i and X ⊆ M , there exists an instance where an E-endowment CBE with optimal social welfare does not exist. This is true even for XOS valuations. The following proposition establishes upper bounds on the social welfare that can be guaranteed in an E-endowment CBE, as a function of β. We say that an allocation S is supported in an endowment equilibrium if there exist prices p such that (S, p) is an endowment equilibrium.
Proposition 5.5. Consider any β < 1, and let E be an endowment environment such that g X i (X) ≤ β · v i (X) for all i. For every ε > 0, it holds that 1. There exists an instance such that no allocation with welfare better than 2−(β+ε) 3−2(β+ε) OP T can be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium.
2. There exists an instance with subadditive consumers such that no allocation with welfare better than 4(1+β+ε) 5+3(β+ε) OP T can be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium.
3. There exists an instance with XOS consumers such that no allocation with welfare better than 8(1+β+ε) 9+7(β+ε) OP T can be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium.
Proof. For the first statement, consider two identical items {s, t}, and two consumers. Consumer 1 has value 1 for a single item, and value x for two items. consumer 2 has value x for any nonempty set. In an optimal allocation each consumer gets a single item, with social welfare 1 + x. Let (p 1 , p 2 ) be the consumers' prices. Suppose w.l.o.g. that in the optimal allocation consumer 1 receives s and consumer 2 receives t. By Definition 3.1, for consumer 1 to accept price p 1 , it must hold that p 1 ≤ 1 + g {s} 1 ({s}). For consumer 1 to not want to add the other item, it must hold that 1 + g
Similarly, for consumer 2 to accept price p 2 it must hold that p 2 ≤ x + g {t} 1 ({t}), and to not prefer buying s at price p 1 , it must hold that x + g {t} 2 ({t}) − p 2 ≥ x − p 1 . We can now write the following sequence of inequalities:
By rearranging we get that the constraints are satisfied only if g
x+1 then the optimal allocation cannot be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium. Set x = 2−β ′ 1−β ′ . For any 0 < β ′ < 1 we have that x > 2 and therefore 0 < x−2 x+1 < 1 and the analysis above holds. Therefore, if β < β ′ then the optimal allocation cannot be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium, and the next best allocation gives a x 1+x = 2−β ′ 3−2β ′ approximation to the optimal welfare. The result follows by setting β ′ = β + ǫ.
For the second and third statements, consider a setting with three identical items {s, t, w} and three consumers. Consumer 1 has valuation (1, 1, 1 + m) , consumer 2 has valuation (m, m, m), and consumer 3 has valuation (a, a, a). We are interested in the case 1 ≥ m > a. Note that consumers 2 and 3 are unit demand. In an optimal allocation each consumer gets one item, the optimal social welfare is 1 + m + a, and the second best allocation achieves social welfare of 1 + m (say, by giving all items to consumer 1). Suppose w.l.o.g. that in the optimal allocation consumer 1 receives s, consumer 2 receives t, and consumer 3 receives w. Each consumer i has a price p i for her item. By Definition 3.1, for consumer 1 to be utility maximizing, she must not want to buy the two other items for a price of p 2 + p 3 for a marginal increase of m, i.e., p 2 + p 3 ≥ m. Consumer 3 must prefer buying over not buying, i.e. p 3 ≤ a + g {w} 3 ({w}). Consumer 2 must prefer her item over w, i.e., m + g
. Therefore, we have the following sequence of inequalities:
where the last inequality follows by that
m+2a , therefore, if β < m−2a m+2a then the optimal allocation cannot be supported in an E-endowment equilibrium.
Set a = m(1−β ′ ) 2(1+β ′ ) , and conclude that if β < β ′ < 1 then the optimal allocation cannot be an allocation of an E-endowment equilibrium., and the next best allocation gives a 2/(2 + m(1−β ′ ) 2(1+β ′ ) ) approximation to the optimal welfare.
For m = 1, consumer 1 is subadditive, and we get that if β < β ′ , then the next best allocation is a 4(1+β ′ ) 5+3β ′ approximation to the optimal social welfare. For m = 1/2, consumer 1 is XOS, and we get that if β < β ′ , then the next best allocation is a 8(1+β ′ ) 9+7β ′ approximation to the optimal social welfare. The results follow by setting β ′ = β + ǫ.
In particular, for β → 1, the above shows that for XOS valuations, if
, then there is no E-endowment equilibrium with optimal social welfare.
Computation of Approximately-Optimal Endowment CBEs
In this section we give a black-box reduction from welfare approximation in an endowment CBE to the pure algorithmic problem of welfare approximation. In particular, we show that for any welfare approximation algorithm ALG, and any good endowment environment E, there exists an algorithm that computes an E-endowment CBE with the same approximation guarantee of ALG.
For submodular valuations, this reduction makes a polynomial number of value queries. For general valuations, it makes a polynomial number of demand queries. 5 We begin by showing that given an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), and any endowment environment E, for the bundling B = {S 1 , . . . , S n }, and the allocation S, together with prices p i ≤ g S i i (S i ), no consumer i gains by discarding S i .
Lemma 5.6. For any instance (v 1 , . . . , v n ), allocation S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ), endowment environment E, and prices satisfying p i ≤ g S i i (S i ) for all i, it holds that for all i and
where the inequality is by monotonicity and the last equality is since i ∈ A.
ALGORITHM 2: An algorithm for good E-endowment CBE for submodular valuations Input: Allocation S 1 , . . . , S n , submodular valuations v 1 , . . . , v n .; Output: Allocation S 1 , . . . , S n , prices p 1 , . . . , p n .
return (S 1 , . . . , S n ), p = (v 1 (S 1 ), . . . , v n (S n )) end end
We are now ready to present the reduction. We begin with the case of submodular consumers. Consider any good endowment environment E. The following theorem shows that for any given allocation S ′ , one can compute an E-endowment CBE (S, p) such that the welfare of S is at least as high as the welfare of S ′ . The algorithm runs in polynomial time, using value queries.
Theorem 5.7. For any instance of submodular valuations (v 1 , . . . , v n ), good endowment environment E, and allocation S ′ , Algorithm 2 computes an E-endowment CBE (S, p) such that SW (S) ≥ SW (S ′ ). The algorithm runs in polynomial time using only value queries.
Proof. First, note that the social welfare increases at every iteration of the while loop: suppose i, j are chosen in a current iteration, i is given S i ∪ S j , and j is left with nothing. This only happens when the condition v i (S i ∪ S j ) > v i (S i ) + v j (S j ) holds, therefore, the sum of values of i and j increases. Since other consumers' allocation did not change, the welfare strictly increases.
Moreover, we begin with n bundles, and only merge bundles, therefore, throughout the algorithm there can be at most 2n different possible bundles. Since we query n consumers, there will be at most 2n 2 value queries throughout the algorithm. Moreover, the algorithm runs in O(n 4 ) time: each iteration requires O(n 2 ) time, and a specific bundle cannot be allocated to a specific consumer more than once. Since there are n consumers and at most 2n different possible bundles, and each iteration either transfers a bundle from one consumer to another, or merges two bundles, there will be at most 2n 2 iterations.
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Let S be the outcome of this algorithm. It remains to show that whenever allocation S satisfies v i (S j |S i ) ≤ v j (S j ) for all i, j ∈ [n],
there exist prices p that together with S form an E-endowment CBE. Consider the prices p i = g S i i (S i ). 6 With these prices, the utility of each consumer in (S, p) is v i (S i ). Suppose by contradiction that some consumer i is not utility maximizing. Then there exists a set A ⊆ [n] so that i would prefer taking the bundles indexed by A, i.e.,
where the second inequality is by Lemma 5.6. Suppose A is ordered in some arbitrary way and denote by A <j all the elements in A that precede the j-th bundle in A. Then the above can be rewritten as
where the last inequality follows by submodularity and by the fact that E is good. Therefore, at least one summand in the right-hand-side expression is positive, which contradicts (5).
The proof of Theorem 5.7 shows that for submodular valuations, it suffices to check in each iteration the marginal contribution of a single bundle. For more general valuations, this is not sufficient. However, the following theorem shows that the same type of reduction can be obtained for general valuations, using demand queries.
ALGORITHM 3: An algorithm for good E-endowment CBE for general valuations Input: Allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), valuation functions (v 1 , . . . , v n ).; Output: Allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), prices (p 1 , . . . , p n ). flag = True while flag do flag = False for i = 1, . . . , n do
S j ← ∅ ∀j ∈ A \ {i}. flag = True end end end return (S 1 , . . . , S n ), p = (v 1 (S 1 ), . . . , v n (S n )).
Theorem 5.8. For any instance of valuations (v 1 , . . . , v n ), good endowment environment E, and allocation S ′ , Algorithm 3 computes an E-endowment CBE (S, p) such that SW (S) ≥ SW (S ′ ). The algorithm runs in polynomial time using demand queries.
Proof. We claim that at each while iteration the welfare increases. Suppose at a current iteration consumer i is re-allocated ∪ j∈A∪{i} S j , and consumers in A \ {i} are allocated the empty set. By definition of the algorithm this happens only if v i (∪ j∈A S j ) − j∈A p j > v i (S i ) − 0.
By monotonicity of v i , it holds that v i (∪ j∈A∪{i} S j ) ≥ v i (∪ j∈A S j ), and by the way the prices are defined in the algorithm (that is, p j = v j (S j ) for all j = i, and p i = 0), we get that v i (∪ j∈A∪{i} S j ) − j∈A∪{i} v j (S j ) > 0. This difference is exactly the change in social welfare due to the re-allocation of ∪ j∈A∪{i} S j to consumer i (and all j ∈ A \ {i} are allocated the empty set).
Since the allocation to all other consumers did not change, the social welfare increases.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.7 the number of different bundles is at most 2n, and there are n consumers, therefore there are at most 2n 2 demand queries. Furthermore, as in the proof of Theorem 5.7, the number of while iterations is at most O(n 2 ), hence the algorithm runs in polynomial time with a polynomial number of demand queries.
Let S be the outcome of this algorithm. For every i and A ⊆ [n] it holds that
Set p i = g S i i (S i ). 7 At these prices, the utility of each consumer in (S, p) is v i (S i ). Suppose by contradiction that some consumer i is not utility maximizing, then there exists a set A ⊆ [n] so that
where the second inequality is by Lemma 5.6 and the last inequality follows by the fact that E is good. Then, the set A ∪ {i} contradicts inequality (6).
